NH Vehicle Inspections Ended. Who Pays When an Unsafe Vehicle Causes a Crash?

New Hampshire has not required an annual vehicle inspection since February 2026. The equipment laws did not go away with it. A driver still has to have working brakes, working lights, and legal tires, and a driver who does not, and who hurts someone because of it, is answerable for that the same way as before.

That is the short answer, and it could surprise people who may assume personal injury liability runs the other way. If the state stopped checking car maintenance, then maybe there is no liability if your brakes would not have passed inspection? That is not how New Hampshire negligence law works, and this article explains why and what the repeal actually did.

Current as of August 17, 2026. The repeal is being litigated and the program's status can change.

Where the program stands right now

The repeal came through the 2025 state budget rather than a standalone road safety bill. House Bill 2 carried it, and the repeal of the inspection program provisions took effect January 31, 2026.

It did not happen quietly. Gordon-Darby Holdings, the vendor that ran New Hampshire's inspection data system for two decades, sued the state in December 2025 under the Clean Air Act. The argument was procedural: the state could not dismantle a program embedded in its federally approved State Implementation Plan, the pollution control commitment a state files with the federal government, without EPA sign-off first. Judge Landya McCafferty granted a preliminary injunction on January 27, 2026, four days before the repeal date, and in late February ordered the state to resume the program.

The state appealed and won a pause. On April 30, 2026, the First Circuit stayed that injunction, finding the state likely to succeed on the merits. Gordon-Darby dismissed its own case the following week and judgment entered June 1, 2026. In July 2026 a new suit was filed by a New Hampshire resident with asthma, joined by Gordon-Darby, seeking to have the program reinstated. On August 11, 2026, EPA published a proposed rule conditionally approving the state's request to drop the program from its plan. Comments close September 25, 2026. It is a proposal, not a final rule.

Where that leaves a driver today: the Department of Justice and the Department of Safety announced on February 13, 2026 that the program was suspended until further notice and that stations should stop issuing stickers. No annual inspection is required at this time. The same guidance reminded drivers that they remain responsible under current law for making sure any vehicle they drive in New Hampshire is safe to operate.

That last sentence is the part the coverage keeps leaving out, and it is the part that decides these cases.

Why the repeal did not take away anyone's personal injury claim

An inspection statute never created a right to sue in the first place. New Hampshire law is firm about this, and the distinction is worth understanding, because it is the reason the repeal changed less than people assume.

The leading case is Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272 (1995), and it is worth saying what it was about, because the facts are nowhere near a car. Students who alleged they had been sexually abused by school employees sued their school districts for failing to report the abuse, as the child abuse reporting statutes require. The case reached the New Hampshire Supreme Court on certified questions from the federal district court, and in answering them the Court sorted out when a statute gives rise to civil liability at all.

The Court separated two different things. One is a statute that creates its own cause of action, where the legislature meant a violation to be suable on its own. The other is the narrower doctrine called negligence per se, which does something more modest: it supplies the standard of conduct in a case where a common law duty already exists, and only where the injured person is in the class the legislature meant to protect and the harm is the kind the statute meant to prevent. Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. at 713-15, 662 A.2d at 276-77.

What the Court did with those two ideas is the useful part. It held there was no private right of action for violating the reporting statutes, 139 N.H. at 715-16, 662 A.2d at 278. And it held that certain school employees nonetheless owed students a common law duty to protect them, grounded in the relationship between them rather than in any statute, 139 N.H. at 717-19, 662 A.2d at 279-80. No statutory claim, and a duty anyway. That is likely the same structure at work here: the inspection statute is gone, and the duty of care it was never the source of is still there.

Negligence per se does not create a duty. The Court has stated the limiting half about as plainly as it can be stated. In Christen v. Fiesta Shows, Inc., 170 N.H. 372, 376, 173 A.3d 162 (2017), it repeated that where no common law duty exists, a plaintiff cannot maintain a negligence action even though the defendant violated a statutory duty. Same holding in Town of Londonderry v. Mesiti Development Co., 168 N.H. 377, 385, 129 A.3d 1012 (2015).

Which is the point. A driver in New Hampshire owes a duty of reasonable care under all the circumstances, and the condition of the vehicle they are driving is one of those circumstances. That duty is common law. It did not come from the inspection statute, and repealing the inspection statute did not touch it.

What did not change: the equipment laws

The repeal took out the machinery of the inspection program. It left the substantive equipment requirements in RSA chapter 266 standing.

RSA 266:27 still reads: "Every motor vehicle driven upon the ways of this state shall be provided with adequate brakes in good working order and sufficient to control such vehicle at all times." That provision carries no repeal notation. Neither does RSA 266:27-a, which requires a parking brake adequate to hold the vehicle on any grade under any load. Neither does RSA 266:31-a, on headlighting equipment. The tire rules survive too, including the one that treats a tire as unsafe when part of the tread design is completely worn and the worn portion is big enough to affect traction and stopping ability.

The New Hampshire Automobile Dealers Association told its members the same thing in January 2026. Owners remain legally responsible for compliance with the safety and equipment standards in RSA chapter 266.

Those surviving statutes are what supply the standard. The principle comes from Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co., 112 N.H. 50, 289 A.2d 68, 71 (1972), a case about a dam left in disrepair, as the Supreme Court later quoted it in Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. at 713: a causal violation of a statutory standard of care is legal fault in the same way a causal violation of the common law standard is.

Two limits on that. Whether a statute applies at all is a question of law for the court, not something a jury decides; if the court rules the statute applies, the jury then decides whether it was breached and whether the breach caused the injury. Lupa v. Jensen, 123 N.H. 644, 646, 465 A.2d 513 (1983), a workers' compensation case, and applied to a motor vehicle statute in Manchenton v. Auto Leasing Corp., 135 N.H. 298, 302-03, 605 A.2d 208, 212 (1992). And no New Hampshire decision has yet answered that question for RSA 266:27 specifically.

So the obligation survived. What ended was the annual, state-supervised checkup that used to catch some of these failures before they caused a crash.

The strongest argument the other way

An article like this should say where its own reasoning is most exposed, because a defense lawyer will find it anyway.

New Hampshire is willing to hold that no duty exists, and it has said so to a vehicle owner. In Manchenton v. Auto Leasing Corp., 135 N.H. 298, 605 A.2d 208 (1992), a leased car was stolen overnight from a private apartment lot in Portsmouth with the keys apparently left in the ignition. Six days later the thief drove it into an oncoming car on Route 28 in Windham, killing one person and severely injuring two others. The Court held the owner and the driver who left the keys "owed no common law duty to members of the general public to remove his keys from his vehicle." 135 N.H. at 306, 605 A.2d at 214.

The analogy writes itself. If no duty runs to the public as to the keys, where does a duty to the public to maintain the brakes come from?

Read what the Court actually relied on, and the analogy comes apart. Manchenton turned on foreseeability, not on any principle that vehicle owners owe the public nothing. The key sentence: "As Mr. Kania left it, his automobile was harmless where parked and threatened no injury to the plaintiffs." 135 N.H. at 305, 605 A.2d at 213. The Court added that even if the theft itself was foreseeable, "the incompetent driving that caused the plaintiffs' injuries was not," and that "the immediate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries was the negligent driving of the thief." Id.

A car with brakes that will not stop it is not harmless where it sits. It becomes dangerous when the person whose care is in question drives it, and no thief, no stranger, and no intervening actor is required to make it so.

And Manchenton is useful to an injured plaintiff, because of what it applied on the way to that result. It is a motor vehicle case in which the Court quoted Moulton for the rule that "a causal violation of a statutory standard of conduct constitutes legal fault in the same manner as does the violation of a common law standard of due care," cited Lupa v. Jensen for the rule that a statute's applicability is a preliminary question of law for the trial court, and framed the test as "whether the harm that occurred was within the risk of danger against which the statute was designed to protect." 135 N.H. at 302-03, 605 A.2d at 212, citing Bagley v. Controlled Environment Corp., 127 N.H. 556, 561, 503 A.2d 823, 827 (1986), and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 (1965). The framework this article relies on is the framework Manchenton used. It simply came out the other way on its facts.

The other case worth knowing cuts for an injured person, though not for the reason it is usually cited. Goodwin v. James, 134 N.H. 579, 595 A.2d 504 (1991), is sometimes described as holding that a disabled vehicle generates a duty. On a morning that was twenty-six below zero, David James could not start his truck and asked his neighbor Goodwin for help. Three men ended up sitting on the hood of the pushing car; James told Goodwin to let go of the truck, Goodwin fell into the road and was run over. The Court found a duty of ordinary care because of what James did and knew: he organised the operation, saw the mismatched bumpers, saw Goodwin in the worst position without a handhold, told him to let go, and admitted he knew the whole thing was "a bad safety idea." 134 N.H. at 584-85, 595 A.2d at 507-08.

That is the real parallel, and it is about knowledge rather than machinery. A person who knows a vehicle is unsafe and proceeds anyway is in the position Goodwin describes. It is also why a repair order reading "brakes metal to metal, customer declined" is worth more in a case like this than any statute.

One limit that nobody flags

RSA 266:27 opens with the words "Every motor vehicle driven upon the ways of this state." That phrase is defined, and the definition is narrow. Under RSA 259:125, I, a "way" means public highways, streets, roads and similar, certain statutory and publicly maintained ways, and "any public or private parking lot which is maintained primarily for the benefit of paying customers."

Manchenton is the warning. The Court there never reached the question of what harm RSA 265:72 was meant to prevent, because it disposed of the statute on the threshold ground that a private apartment parking lot was not a "way" at all. 135 N.H. at 303, 605 A.2d at 212.

So a crash in a private lot, a condominium drive, or an employer's yard may sit outside RSA 266:27 entirely, which would leave the claim resting on common law reasonable care with no statutory standard to borrow. No New Hampshire decision has applied the "ways" limitation to RSA 266:27 specifically, and the definition in RSA 259:125 has been amended several times since 1992. It is a live issue and worth knowing before anyone assumes the statute does the work.

Neither Manchenton nor Goodwin decides this case. That is the honest position, and it is why a claim like this turns on its specific facts rather than on a rule anyone can look up.

Where this actually comes up, and where it does not

Most New Hampshire car crashes have nothing to do with the condition of anybody's vehicle. They come from failure to yield at an intersection, following too closely, failure to keep a proper lookout, unsafe speed for the conditions, and impairment. Those cases are proved the way they have always been proved: the scene, the police investigation, the physical damage, witness accounts, and the parties' own testimony. The inspection repeal is irrelevant to them.

A mechanical failure case is a narrower thing. It generally starts with a specific reason to think a component let go: a driver who says the brakes went to the floor, a witness who says the car never slowed, a known service problem, a wheel or tire found separated from the vehicle, or physical evidence at the scene that does not fit driver error.

The honest position is that you usually do not know which kind of case you have at the outset. That matters for a practical reason covered further down: some of the evidence that would tell you disappears quickly, which means the question has to be asked early even when the answer is probably no.

How these claims are proved

The vehicle is the evidence, and it does not stay put

After a serious crash a vehicle goes to a tow yard, then to a salvage auction, then to a crusher or a parts yard in another state. Insurers total vehicles and dispose of them quickly. Once it is gone, the question of whether a tie rod failed before impact or because of it becomes unanswerable. That is why a preservation demand, a written notice telling the holder not to destroy or alter the vehicle, has to go out in the first days rather than the first month. It matters most as to the other vehicle, which is the one your side does not control.

Maintenance history outlives the vehicle

Repair orders, parts invoices, oil change records, warranty claims, and recall notices show what the owner was told and when. A repair order reading "brakes metal to metal, customer declined" is a very different case from a vehicle with no service history at all. Dealerships and chain shops keep this data, but they purge it on a schedule.

The car's recording

Most vehicles built in the last fifteen years store pre-crash data in an event data recorder, which is the automotive version of a black box. It captures speed, throttle, brake application, and seat belt status in the seconds before impact. Whether the other driver hit the brakes, and what the car did when they did, is often recoverable. This evidence is useful in an ordinary MVA too, not only a mechanical failure case, and downloading it requires the vehicle.

Somebody has to actually look at the parts

Until this year the state had a role here. The repealed version of RSA 266:1 contained a paragraph X authorizing the director to have qualified persons inspect a vehicle involved in a fatal crash, or one involving serious bodily injury as defined in RSA 625:11, VI. That was a state mechanism for putting trained eyes on a wrecked car after a catastrophic collision. It went with the rest of RSA 266:1. The published state mirrors of that section currently disagree on the repeal notation, but the operative fact is not in doubt: no such inspection is being conducted.

The corrosion rule went too. RSA 266:3-a had required an external visual examination for rust on passenger vehicles and light trucks, with mandatory failure criteria. Brake lines corrode. Fuel lines corrode. Subframes and suspension mounts corrode. Nobody is checking now.

So this is the one place the repeal genuinely made an injured person's case harder. The examination the state once performed is now performed by an expert the injured person's attorney retains, usually a mechanical engineer or an accident reconstructionist, or it is not performed at all.

Expect the other driver to say the brakes suddenly failed

There is a further reason speed matters, and this one is a car case from a New Hampshire road.

In Meaney v. Rubega, 142 N.H. 530, 703 A.2d 1384 (1997), a State Police trooper was struck as he got out of his cruiser at a construction site on Interstate 89 in Hopkinton. The driver who hit him denied liability "on the basis of the failing of his brakes, which were presumed to be in good working order." The trooper asked the trial court to instruct the jury that sudden brake failure is an affirmative defense, which would have put the burden on the driver to prove it. The court refused, the jury returned a defense verdict, and the Supreme Court affirmed.

Brake failure is a denial of negligence, not an affirmative defense. 142 N.H. at 532-33, 703 A.2d at 1385-86. It "reflects nothing more than a denial by the defendant of negligence," and, in the language the Court adopted, "the risk of non-persuasion on the issue of defendant's negligence remains with the plaintiff." Id. at 533, 703 A.2d at 1386.

Read that from the injured person's side. The other driver can say the brakes let go without warning, and you cannot shift the burden by calling it a defense. You have to answer it. The answer to "sudden" is proof that it was not sudden: service records, prior complaints, the physical state of the components, and what the vehicle itself shows.

Justice Johnson dissented, and his reasoning is the best statement of why any of this is urgent. Quoting the California Supreme Court, he wrote that in a brake failure case the defendant "was in control of the vehicle prior to the accident and who had access to knowledge of its condition at that time," and that "after the accident, the defendant generally retains possession of the defective vehicle and will often repair the brakes before any claim is made by the plaintiff." 142 N.H. at 534, 703 A.2d at 1386-87, quoting Harris v. Irish Truck Lines, Inc., 11 Cal. 3d 373, 521 P.2d 481, 483-84 (1974). He would have required the defendant to prove the brakes were defective, that the defect was unknown, that it could not have been found through due care, and that it was the sole proximate cause.

He lost. New Hampshire did not adopt that rule. So the burden of answering a brake-failure defense sits where the majority left it, and the evidence needed to answer it is in a vehicle the other side controls and may repair or scrap. That is the case for acting in days rather than months, and it comes from the judge who was arguing for the injured person.

One note of caution. Meaney is a memorandum opinion with a dissent, and the dissent points out that the New Hampshire case the majority relied on, Dyer v. Herb Prout & Co., 126 N.H. 763, 498 A.2d 715 (1985), did not involve brake failure at all. Courts elsewhere are split. It is settled enough to plan around and not so settled that it could never be revisited.

Who can be responsible besides the driver

The owner who handed over the keys. New Hampshire recognizes negligent entrustment. An owner may be liable for injury to a third person from the operation of a vehicle entrusted to someone whose incompetence to operate it the owner knew or should have known. That is the rule from Weaver v. Stewart, 169 N.H. 420, 425, 151 A.3d 70 (2016), which also shows the Court will hold a plaintiff strictly to the second half of it: you have to prove the owner's knowledge, not just the driver's unfitness.

The shop that did the work. A repair facility that performs brake work carelessly may owe a duty to people foreseeably endangered by the failure. The route to that duty is Restatement (Second) of Torts section 324A, which makes a person who undertakes services for another, where those services are necessary to protect a third person, answerable to that third person for physical harm caused by a failure to use reasonable care.

The New Hampshire case to know is Bloom v. Casella Construction, Inc., 172 N.H. 625, 232 A.3d 357 (2019), and it is about a parking lot rather than a garage. A nurse at Dartmouth-Hitchcock in Lebanon parked, took two steps, and fell on untreated ice. She sued the snow plowing contractor. The trial court threw the case out, reasoning that the contractor had not "completely subsume[d] or supplant[ed]" the hospital's duty to keep its property safe, since the contract split the work and left most of the salting with the hospital.

The Supreme Court reversed on that point, and the rule it stated is the useful one. A defendant does not escape section 324A(b) by showing it took on only part of the job. Quoting a federal decision with approval, the Court said subsection (b) "comes into play as long as the party who owes the plaintiff a duty of care has delegated to the defendant any particular part of that duty." 172 N.H. at 630-31, 232 A.3d at 362. Because there was a genuine dispute about the scope of what the contractor had actually undertaken, the case went back for trial.

Read that against a brake job. A garage does not take over everything an owner owes the driving public. It takes over a particular part of it, which is the part it was paid to do. Under Bloom that is enough to put the question in front of a jury, and the fight becomes what the shop actually undertook. Which is decided by the repair order.

One more, because of what it involves. In Drapeau v. Bluestem Brands, Inc., No. 22-cv-00150-PB, 2025 DNH 052 (D.N.H. Apr. 14, 2025), a mother and her eight year old son were badly burned in Somersworth when a pressure cooker lid blew off. They sued the company hired to test, inspect and certify the product, and the federal court held that the certifier's duty to them was governed by section 324A, letting the negligence claim past a motion to dismiss. It is a pleading ruling in a product case rather than a decision about a garage. It is worth knowing anyway, in an article about the end of a state inspection program, that New Hampshire courts are prepared to hear a claim that an inspection was performed negligently.

For an injured person the practical point is unchanged. This is where those repair orders stop being background and become the case.

An employer. If the vehicle was a work truck or a company car, the employer's maintenance program, or the absence of one, is in issue, along with the employer's responsibility for the driver's own negligence.

A manufacturer. Where a component failed as designed or built rather than through neglect, the claim is a product defect case, with its own elements and its own proof requirements. That is a different claim from the maintenance negligence this article otherwise describes, and it is the only place the word "defective" belongs.

What if your own poorly maintained car is partly at fault?

New Hampshire uses modified comparative fault under RSA 507:7-d. Your fault is measured against the fault of the defendants in the aggregate. If your share is not greater than theirs you recover, reduced by your percentage. Above that line you recover nothing. There is a related rule worth knowing: under RSA 507:7-e, I(b), a party found less than 50 percent at fault is severally and not jointly liable, and is answerable only for the damages attributable to that party. How that arithmetic works in practice is covered on the comparative fault page.

Do not over-read one point. Under Johnson v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 83 N.H. 350, 356, 143 A. 516 (1928), a plaintiff's statutory violation is immaterial to responsibility if it had nothing to do with the accident. But if it did contribute, your fault is still compared with the defendant's. Your poorly maintained vehicle remains ordinary comparable fault whether or not any inspection rule exists. Johnson is also a 1928 decision from the contributory negligence era, so read it for the causation principle rather than the remedy.

Southern New Hampshire, and why corrosion matters here

Southern New Hampshire roads are salted five months a year. Corrosion-driven failures of brake lines, fuel lines, and suspension components were exactly what the repealed rust examination was aimed at, and proof of one now requires an inspection nobody will perform unless somebody asks for it. That is a regional consequence of a statewide repeal.

The roads where crashes cluster are the ones people drive every day. The Route 101 and Wallace Road corridor, and South River Road, in Bedford. Mast Road through Pinardville in Goffstown. I-293, the Amoskeag Bridge, and the Second Street and Bridge Street approaches in Manchester.

Injury cases from these communities are filed in Hillsborough County Superior Court, Northern District, at 300 Chestnut Street in Manchester, which covers Bedford, Goffstown, Manchester, New Boston, and Weare. The Southern District sits in Nashua. Apis Law keeps offices in Goffstown and Bedford. See the Bedford, Goffstown, and Manchester pages for how these claims are handled here, the New Hampshire car accident page for the broader claim process, Keith's background and admissions, and case results.

Deadlines, and the exception most people miss

New Hampshire gives you three years to bring a personal injury action under RSA 508:4, and the clock runs from the act or omission complained of, not necessarily from the day you found out about it.

There is an exception written into the statute. Where the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered, and could not reasonably have been discovered, at the time of the act or omission, the action must be commenced within three years of when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the injury and its causal relationship. The Supreme Court has described this provision as codifying the common law discovery rule. Perez v. Pike Industries, Inc., 153 N.H. 158, 160, 889 A.2d 27 (2005); see also Glines v. Bruk, 140 N.H. 180, 664 A.2d 79 (1995). A component that failed silently is close to the classic case for it.

Do not assume you are out of time without asking.

Practical steps, if a mechanical failure may be involved

These apply to the narrower category of case described above, not to every crash. If there is any reason to think a component failed, they are worth doing in the first days.

1. Find out where the other vehicle was towed and write the address down.

2. Tell a lawyer promptly, so a written preservation letter can go to the tow yard, the vehicle owner, and the insurer. That letter comes from counsel and has to specify what may not be destroyed or altered.

3. Photograph both vehicles, the tires, the roadway, and the scene.

4. Get the police report number.

5. Write down the name of anyone who said the vehicle had a problem, and what they said.

Step 2 is the one with a clock on it. In any crash, mechanical failure or not, the general advice holds: see a doctor and keep going, keep your bills and a record of missed work, and do not give the other driver's insurer a recorded statement before talking to a lawyer.

What it costs to find out

A case review costs nothing, and asking does not commit you to anything.

The expense people ask about is the expert. Establishing that a brake line failed before impact rather than during it usually takes a qualified engineer to examine the parts, and that is not cheap. In cases the firm takes on a contingency basis, the firm advances costs of that kind and recovers them out of the settlement or award rather than billing you as the case goes along. It is an advance, not a gift, and the arrangement is set out in writing before anything is spent.

Your medical bills and lost wages are recoverable elements of the claim, along with pain and the disruption to your life.

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Frequently asked questions

Do I still need a vehicle inspection in New Hampshire in 2026?

No. The New Hampshire Department of Justice and Department of Safety announced on February 13, 2026 that the inspection program is suspended until further notice, and stations stopped issuing stickers. The repeal is still being litigated. If a court reinstates the program, the requirement comes back. You remain responsible for keeping your vehicle safe to operate under RSA chapter 266.

Can I still bring a claim if an unsafe vehicle caused my crash in New Hampshire?

Yes, on the same footing as before the repeal. The inspection statute never created the right to sue. A claim rests on the common law duty of reasonable care, which takes in the condition of the vehicle, plus the equipment statutes that survived, including RSA 266:27 and its requirement of adequate brakes in good working order at all times. What you have to prove is that the condition of the vehicle actually caused the crash. No New Hampshire decision has yet held that RSA 266:27 sets the standard of care in a civil case, so expect the point to be argued.

Does the end of inspections make an unsafe vehicle claim harder to prove?

In one specific way, yes. The repealed RSA 266:1, X once let the state inspect vehicles from fatal and serious injury crashes, and that mechanism is gone. Proof now depends on the vehicle being preserved and an expert examining it. Expect the other driver to say the brakes failed without warning: under Meaney v. Rubega, 142 N.H. 530 (1997), that is a denial of negligence rather than an affirmative defense, so the burden of answering it stays with you.

Most crashes are not about the car. Does any of this apply to an ordinary accident?

Not directly. Most New Hampshire crashes turn on failure to yield, following too closely, failure to keep a proper lookout, or speed, and those cases are proved the way they always have been. The repeal matters where there is a real reason to think a component failed. The overlap is that the other vehicle can hold useful evidence in either kind of case, and it does not stay available for long.

How long do I have to file a personal injury claim in New Hampshire?

Three years under RSA 508:4, running from the act or omission complained of. The statute contains a discovery rule: if you could not reasonably have discovered the injury and its cause at the time, the three years runs from when you discovered it or should have. Where a claim depends on physical evidence, the practical window is much shorter than the legal one.

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Talk to Keith directly. Call (603) 785-1013 or use the contact form.

Apis Law, PLLC 470 Mast Road, Goffstown, NH 03045 3 Executive Park Drive, Ste 201E, Bedford, NH 03110 (603) 785-1013

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> About the Author > Keith F. Diaz, Esq. is the founder of Apis Law, PLLC, a New Hampshire personal injury and employment law firm. Attorney Diaz has been practicing in New Hampshire since 2003 and is admitted to practice in the State of New Hampshire (Bar No. 15831), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals. He founded Apis Law in 2022 to provide dedicated, client-focused representation to individuals and families throughout New Hampshire.

This article is general information about New Hampshire law and is not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied. The status of the vehicle inspection program is the subject of active litigation and may change. Last reviewed August 17, 2026.

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